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Abstract. Data breaches—mass leakage of stored information—are a
major security concern. Encryption can provide confidentiality, but en-
cryption depends on a key which, if compromised, allows the attacker to
decrypt everything, effectively instantly. Security of encrypted data thus
becomes a question of protecting the encryption keys. In this paper, we
propose using keyless encryption to construct a mass leakage resistant
archiving system, where decryption of a file is only possible after the re-
quester, whether an authorized user or an adversary, completes a proof
of work in the form of solving a cryptographic puzzle. This proposal is
geared towards protection of infrequently-accessed archival data, where
any one file may not require too much work to decrypt, decryption of
a large number of files—mass leakage—becomes increasingly expensive
for an attacker. We present a prototype implementation realized as a
user-space file system driver for Linux. We report experimental results
of system behaviour under different file sizes and puzzle difficulty lev-
els. Our keyless encryption technique can be added as a layer on top
of traditional encryption: together they provide strong security against
adversaries without the key and resistance against mass decryption by
an attacker.
Keywords: Filesystem encryption · Data archiving · Proof-of-work ·
Client puzzles · Mass leakage · Data breaches
1 Introduction
Attacks on information systems have become increasingly common. Whatever
the attack vector, a frequent outcome is a data breach, in which a large volume
of sensitive information is stolen from the victim organization. Archival data—
stored indefinitely but not regularly accessed—has been targeted in many data
breaches [4,14,18], leading to loss of privacy, loss of reputation, business setbacks,
and costly remediation.
Modern IT security protection techniques focus on defense-in-depth, one com-
ponent of which is encryption of data at rest to support confidentiality. However,
encryption, even when implemented using secure, carefully implemented algo-
rithms, is typically all-or-nothing: if the key is secure, the attacker learn virtually
nothing, and the attack cannot succeed, but once the key is compromised, the
attacker can decrypt everything, with minimal overhead.
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Hardware-assisted cryptography, such as hardware security modules (HSMs),
trusted computing, or secure enclaves like Intel SGX3 or ARM TrustZone4 may
prevent keys from leaking if decryption is only ever done inside a trusted module,
but many IT systems remain software-only without use of these technologies.
Scenario and goals. Against these types of threats, we aim develop a mass leak-
age resistant archiving system with the goal of enhancing defense-in-depth for
encryption. We aim to preserve confidentiality even in the presence of an adver-
sary with full access to the system, including ciphertexts and decryption keys.
While no system can provide full cryptographic security in the face of such a
well-informed adversary, our goal is to increase the economic cost of mass leak-
age, which for our purposes is defined as an adversary obtaining the plaintexts
of a large number of files or database records, not just one.
Unlike most applications of cryptography, we do not aim to achieve a differ-
ence in work factor between honest parties and adversaries. Rather, we assume
that honest parties and adversaries have different goals, and we aim to change
the economics of data breaches by achieving a difference in the cost of honest
parties and adversaries achieving their goals. In our scenario, honest parties need
to store a large number of files, but only access a small number of them. Consider
for example a tax agency: after processing millions of citizens’ tax returns each
year, those files must be stored for several years in case an audit or further anal-
ysis is required, but only a small fraction of those records will end up actually
being pulled for analysis. In contrast, an adversary breaching the tax agency’s
records may want to read a large number of files to identify good candidates for
identity theft or other criminal actions.
1.1 Contributions
We design a system, called ArchiveSafe, where access to a resource is only pos-
sible after the requester—whether an honest user on adversary—has expended
sufficient computational effort, in the form of solving a “moderately hard” proof-
of-work or cryptographic puzzle [10]. Since we will not rely on the access control
system nor any keys to be uncompromised, the decryption operation itself must
be tied to the cryptographic puzzle. In our approach, while a proper crypto-
graphic key is used to encrypt a file, the encryption key is not stored, even for
legitimate users. Instead, the key is wrapped in a proof-of-work-based encryption
scheme with a desired difficulty level, and all users—adversarial or honest—must
perform the proof-of-work to recover the key and then decrypt the file.
Our main technical tool for building of ArchiveSafe is a new cryptographic
primitive that we call difficulty-based keyless encryption (DBKE), which is an
encryption scheme that does not make use of a stored key. We give a generic
construction for DBKE from a standard symmetric encryption scheme and a new
3 https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx
4 https://developer.arm.com/ip-products/security-ip/trustzone
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Application ArchiveSafe Driver Underlying Storage
write m
generate puzzle, key
c← Enc(k,m)
write puz, c
read
read
puz, c
k ← Solve(puz)
m← Dec(k, c)
m
Fig. 1: High-level overview of ArchiveSafe, showing a write followed by a read.
tool called difficulty-based keyless key wrap, which wraps the symmetric encryp-
tion key in an encapsulation that can only be unwrapped by performing a suffi-
ciently high number of operations, as in a proof-of-work scheme. Difficulty-based
keyless key wrap can be achieved from many types of cryptographic puzzles, and
we show one example based on hash function partial pre-image finding [11, 12].
One interesting feature of using this form of hash-based puzzle, which to our
knowledge is a novel observation on hash-based puzzles, is that the puzzle and
ciphertext can be degraded—i.e., turned into a harder one—essentially for free.
We use the reductionist security methodology to formalize the syntax and secu-
rity properties of difficulty-based keyless encryption and keyless key wrap and
show that our hash-based construction achieves these properties.
Figure 1 gives a high-level overview of how an application interacts with
the ArchiveSafe system. The two main operations performed by the ArchiveSafe
system are (i) creating a puzzle and encrypting during writes, and (ii) solving
the puzzle and decrypting during reads. ArchiveSafe could be used in a variety
of data storage architectures: on a local computer; on a file server; or in a cloud
architecture. In a file server or cloud scenario, an IT system may be set up so
the file server enforces that all files are protected by ArchiveSafe during writes
by centralizing puzzle creation and encryption, but leaves puzzle solving and
decryption to clients. Since puzzle creation and encryption in our system is
cheap, this avoids bottlenecks on the file server. Individual client applications
occasionally reading a small number of files have to do a moderate, but not
prohibitive, amount of work to solve the puzzle to obtain the key to decrypt.
We build a prototype implementation showing the use of ArchiveSafe on
a local computer. Our prototype is implemented as a filesystem-in-userspace
(FUSE) driver on Linux. A FUSE driver can be used to intercept I/O operations
in certain directories (mount points) before reading/writing to disk. This allows
us to implement ArchiveSafe in a manner that is transparent to the application,
as well as transparent to the underlying storage mechanism, which could be
a local disk (with normal disk encryption enabled or not), or a network share
mounted locally. We validate the performance of our prototype implementation,
focusing primarily on ensuring that write operations incur minimal overhead.
(Since system administrators can set policies with puzzle difficulties requiring
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seconds or minutes of computational effort to solve, slow read performance is
intended, and there is little sense in performance measurements on reads, beyond
checking that they scale as intended with no unexpected overhead.) We envision
that, when used on a local computer, ArchiveSafe would be applied only to a
subset of the directories on the computer. One might use ArchiveSafe to protect
documents created by the user more than a certain number of days ago, but
would not use it on system libraries and executables.
We highlight that ArchiveSafe is meant to add defense-in-depth to confiden-
tiality: one would typically not rely on ArchiveSafe alone, but combine it with
traditional encrypted file system or database encryption. In this combination,
traditional encryption using strong algorithms and keys, provides a high level of
security if the keys are not compromised, but we still have the difficulty-based
keyless encryption of ArchiveSafe as a bulwark if the keys are compromised. To
succeed under this setup, the adversary must compromise the traditional encryp-
tion keys in addition to solving a large number of DBKE puzzles corresponding
to the files in the archive.
1.2 Related Work
Filesystem encryption. Blaze [6] introduced the Cryptographic File System (CFS).
CFS uses a different key for each directory, and the user is required to enter the
key in every session to access the directory and its contents. Subsequent propos-
als include the Transparent Cryptographic File System (TCFS) [7], Cryptfs [24]
and Ncryptfs [23]. In recent years, encrypted filesystems have become widespread,
and all major operating systems provide implementations, often enabled by de-
fault (FileVault on Apple’s macOS5, BitLocker on Microsoft Windows6, and a
range of options on Linux such as Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS)7). The
common practice in these technologies is to use a single master key from which
multiple keys are derived per-file, per-directory, or per-sector; the master key is
usually stored on the device itself, encrypted under the user’s password. Once
the user has logged in, the filesystem transparently and automatically decrypts
files.
Over the past decade, there has been much research on encrypted databases
(e.g., [13,15,16]) that retain some functionality for legitimate users, for example
using order-preserving encryption so that sorting a column of ciphertexts yields
approximately the same order as if the plaintexts were sorted. This increased
functionality comes at the cost of information leakage, and there is an extensive
debate in the literature about these techniques.
Proof-of-work systems. Dwork and Naor [10] introduced client puzzles to control
junk email: recipients would only accept emails if the sender was able to solve
5 https://support.apple.com/en-ca/HT204837
6 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-
protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-overview
7 https://guardianproject.info/archive/luks/
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a puzzle. It should be “moderately hard” for the sender to solve the puzzle,
but easy for recipient to check whether a solution is valid. This was the first
example of a proof-of-work system, which in general grants access to a resource
dependent on the requester being able to demonstrate proof that they have
performed some work, typically in the form of solving a puzzle. Client puzzles
were for many years suggested as a means to prevent denial of service attacks in a
range of contexts [2,8,12,17,20,22], but have seen renewed interest as a building
block for cryptocurrencies and blockchains. Client puzzles are generally classified
either based on their limiting factors in solving the puzzle (CPU-bound versus
memory-bound) or based on whether the operations required to solve the puzzle
is parallelizable. The simplest CPU-bound puzzles are based on cryptographic
hash functions, such as: finding a preimage of a hash given a hint (e.g., a part
of the preimage) [11, 12]; or finding an input whose hash starts with a certain
number of zero bits [3]. Non-parallelizable CPU-bound puzzles often rely on
a number of theoretical approaches. For example, [19] uses repeated squaring
modulo an RSA modulus. Memory-bound puzzles [1,9] use techniques for which
the best known solving algorithm involves a large number of memory accesses;
it is argued that memory access time varies less than CPU speed between small
and large computing platforms, and that building customized hardware is more
expensive for memory-bound puzzles.
Proof-of-work systems for confidentiality. In [19], time-lock encryption was pro-
posed as a way of “sending information into the future”, and focused specifically
on hiding keys or data in a proof-of-work system that had a predictable wall-
clock time for solving, thus focusing on puzzles for which the best known solving
algorithm is inherently sequential. Vargas et al. [21] designed a database encryp-
tion system called “Dragchute” based on time-lock encryption, aiming to provide
both confidentiality and the ability to demonstrate compliance with retention
laws. Each ciphertext in this system is accompanied by an authentication tag
which contains a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. Solving the puzzle will
yield a valid decryption key for the ciphertext; moreover, the proof can be checked
much more efficiently than the full work required to solve and decrypt the ci-
phertext. A simpler database encryption scheme relying on hash-based client
puzzles, without any efficient verification of well-formedness, was proposed by
Moghimifar [13].
2 Requirements
In this section, we discuss the functionality and security requirements for a
mass leakage resistant archiving system, which informs our construction and
evaluation in subsequent sections.
2.1 Design Criteria
Confidentiality in the face of compromised keys. The system should achieve some
level of confidentiality even if all stored keys are compromised. This means we
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assume that an adversary can learn a symmetric key or a private key correspond-
ing to a public key stored for later use in decrypting a ciphertext, even if the
key is stored in a separate key management service, trusted computing or secure
enclave environment, or separate tamper-resistant device.
Cooperation with traditional encryption. It should be possible to use the sys-
tem in conjunction with the traditional encryption mechanisms applied to stor-
age systems (folder/disk encryption, database encryption, etc.), so that strong
confidentiality is achieved if keys are not compromised, but some confidentiality
is retained in the face of compromised keys.
Reliance on industry standard cryptographic algorithms. Deployed IT systems
should rely only on well-vetted, standardized cryptographic algorithms. But all
such algorithms for achieving confidentiality—public key or symmetric—require
a secret key, seemingly conflicting with the first design criteria of confidential-
ity in the face of compromised keys. Our construction builds a mechanism for
confidentiality without keys while still relying on standard cryptographic algo-
rithms like AES for symmetric encryption: while a proper cryptographic key is
used to encrypt data, that key is not kept, even by authorized users. Instead,
the key is wrapped in a proof-of-work-based encryption scheme with a desired
difficulty level, and users must solve the proof-of-work to recover the key and
then decrypt the data. We introduce difficulty-based keyless encryption in Sec-
tion 3 which formalizes this idea and generically construct it from standard
cryptographic algorithms such as AES and Argon2.
Imposing a significant cost to access a large number of files while maintain-
ing acceptable cost to access one file. Since we do not have a key that gives
honest users an advantage over the adversary, we should look at things from the
viewpoint of typical honest behaviour—periodically accessing a small number
of files—versus adversary behaviour—accessing a large number of files in a data
breach. Proof-of-work and related techniques have long been used to achieve secu-
rity goals from that viewpoint, whether in password hardening or client puzzles
for denial of service resistance.
Customizing file access cost. It should be possible for a system administrator
or user to control the cost incurred by the adversary or honest user for accessing
a file. This may be set as a system-wide policy or a file-by-file basis, depending
on the desired access control paradigm. This is achieved in our system by varying
the difficulty level of the puzzle wrapping the decryption key.
A related design criteria is the ability to customize file access cost over time.
Demand for access to records may change over time; for example, records older
than 5 years may be accessed much less frequently than more recent records. Our
system allows the file access cost to be increased with minimal effort, through
a process we call puzzle degradation, that could be performed as part of regular
system maintenance. This is a novel feature available from some types of puzzle
constructions but not others, and in particular not from the number-theoretic
repeated squaring non-parallelizable constructions used in time-lock puzzles [19]
and the Dragchute database encryption system [21].
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2.2 Choice of Puzzle
One of the major design decisions for our system is which type of puzzles to use:
sequential versus parallelizable, and CPU-bound versus memory-bound.
As our design criteria focus on mass leakage adversaries trying to decrypt
many files, and since we think of cost in a general economic sense, we do not have
to restrict to proof-of-work mechanisms that are sequential/non-parallelizable.
Concerned with an adversary trying to decrypt many files who has parallel com-
puting resources available to them, it does not matter whether they choose to
deploy their parallel resources to sequentially decrypt each file quickly or in par-
allel decrypt many files more slowly. Overall, they will decrypt the same number
of files with the same resources. We also need not worry about the variability
of puzzle solving time for individual instances, only the expected puzzle solv-
ing time for many instances. These design choices are, for example, significantly
different from those of the Dragchute system for database confidentiality and
integrity from proof-of-work. Moreover, parallelization permits honest users to
reduce the latency in occasional access of files by taking advantage of short,
on-demand use of cloud servers (see Table 3).
Whereas sequential versus parallelizable puzzles is a qualitative choice for our
scenario, CPU-bound versus memory-bound is a quantitative choice with respect
to the economic cost. To achieve a given dollar-cost-for-adversary, it is possible
to pick appropriate parameters for both CPU-bound and memory-bound puzzles
under appropriate cost and puzzle-solving assumptions. So, a priori, either can be
used in our constructions. For our prototype we choose simple hash-based CPU-
bound puzzles because puzzle creation is cheaper (thereby achieving extremely
low overhead on write operations) and because they allow us to obtain novel
useful functionality such as puzzle degradation (Section 3.3), but with the hash
function being Argon2 which is designed to be resistant to GPU and ASIC
optimization. Picking appropriate difficulty levels for puzzles is something an
adopter must do as a function of the tolerable cost for honest users to access data,
the perceived risk of a data breach, and the anticipated value of the information
to an adversary. We do not aim to study such economic calculations exhaustively,
but we provide one worked example in Section 4.4 and Table 3.
2.3 Threat Model
ArchiveSafe is a software system with one target asset, the data files. The security
goal for the target asset is confidentiality. As shown in Figure 1, information
flows from the user application through the ArchiveSafe driver to the underlying
storage during writes, and in the reverse direction during reads.
An adversary could access the system either via the same mechanism as
an honest user application (i.e., mediated by the ArchiveSafe driver), or may
have direct access to the underlying storage. We aim to achieve confidentiality
against a strong adversary that can bypass the ArchiveSafe driver during read
operations (e.g., because they are untrusted server administrators, or because
they have compromised the kernel using privilege escalation), or who can directly
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Expdb-ind∆,d (A):
1. (m0,m1, st)←$A(1
d)
2. b←$ {0, 1}
3. c←$ ∆.Enc(d,mb)
4. b′←$A(c, st)
5. return (b′ = b)
ExpindΠ (A):
1. (m0,m1, st)←$A()
2. k←$ K
3. b←$ {0, 1}
4. c←$ Π.Enc(k,mb)
5. b′ ←$A(c, st)
6. return (b′ = b)
Expkey-indΣ,d (A):
1. (k0, w)←$ Σ.Wrap()
2. k1 ←$ K
3. b←$ {0, 1}
4. b′←$A(w, k0, k1)
5. return (b′ = b)
Fig. 2: Security experiments for (left) indistinguishability of difficulty-based key-
less encryption scheme ∆ at difficulty level d; (centre) one-time indistinguisha-
bility of symmetric encryption scheme Π ; and (right) indistinguishability of
difficulty-based keyless key wrap scheme Σ with keyspace K and difficulty level
d.
read from the underlying storage (e.g., an untrusted cloud storage provider, or
physical theft of a hard drive). We do not consider in our threat model an
adversary who undermines the write operation to intercept data during a write
operation or who prevents the ArchiveSafe technique from being applied when
saving files. We assume operations by honest parties are performed on a trusted
and uncompromised system that faithfully deletes keys from memory once an
operation is completed.
3 Difficulty-Based Keyless Encryption
A difficulty-based key encryption scheme is similar to a symmetric encryption
scheme, except that no secret key is kept for use between the encryption and
decryption algorithm.
Definition 1 (Difficulty-Based Keyless Encryption). A difficulty-based
keyless encryption (DBKE) scheme ∆ for a message space M with maximum
difficulty D ∈ N consists of two algorithms:
– ∆.Enc(d,m) $→ c: A (probabilistic) encryption algorithm that takes as input
difficulty level d ≤ D and message m and outputs ciphertext c.
– ∆.Dec(c) → m′: A deterministic decryption algorithm that takes as input
ciphertext c and outputs message m′ or an error ⊥ 6∈ M.
A DBKE ∆ is correct if, for all messages m ∈ M and all difficulty levels
d ≤ D, we have that Pr [∆.Dec(∆.Enc(d,m)) = m] = 1, where the probability
is taken over the randomness of ∆.Enc.
The desired security property for a DBKE is semantic security in the form
of ciphertext indistinguishability. Since there is no persistent secret key, there
is no need to consider security notions incorporating chosen plaintext or cho-
sen ciphertext attacks: each plaintext is protected by independent randomness.
The security experiment Expdb-ind∆,d (A) for an adversary A trying to break indis-
tinguishability of DBKE scheme ∆ at difficulty level d is shown in Figure 2.
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We define the advantage of such an adversary in the security experiment as
Advdb-ind∆,d (A) =
∣∣∣2 · Pr [Expdb-ind∆,d (A)⇒ true
]
− 1
∣∣∣. Useful forms of Advdb-ind∆,d (A)
will relate the amount of work done by the adversary, the difficulty level, and
the adversary’s success probability.
3.1 Generic construction of DBKE
Our main construction of DBKE, as shown in Figure 3, generically combines
a traditional symmetric encryption scheme with a “keyless key wrap”, which is
difficulty-based form of key wrapping: there is no “master key” wrapping the ses-
sion key, instead the session key is recovered via some difficulty-based operation.
In this subsection we present the generic building blocks we use to construct
DBKE. In Section 3.2 we show how to instantiate the keyless key wrap.
Definition 2 (Symmetric encryption scheme). A symmetric encryption
scheme Π with secret key space K = {0, 1}λ and message space M consists
of two algorithms:
– Π.Enc(k,m) $→ c: A (probabilistic) encryption algorithm that takes as input
key k ∈ K and message m ∈ M and outputs ciphertext c.
– Π.Dec(k, c)→ m′: A deterministic decryption algorithm that takes as input
key k ∈ K and ciphertext c and outputs message m′ ∈M or an error ⊥ 6∈ M.
Correctness is defined in the obvious way. For our purposes, a sufficient se-
curity property will be one-time semantic security, in the form of ciphertext
indistinguishability. As above, we will not need to consider security notions in-
corporating chosen plaintext or chosen ciphertext attacks, since our system will
use a key only once. The security experiment ExpindΠ (A) for an adversaryA trying
to break indistinguishability of symmetric encryption scheme Π is shown in Fig-
ure 2. We define the advantage of such an adversary in the security experiment
as AdvindΠ (A) =
∣∣∣2 · Pr [ExpindΠ (A)⇒ true
]
− 1
∣∣∣.
The second building block for our construction is a keyless key wrap scheme.
Symmetric
Encryption
Π.Enc
Keyless
Key Wrap
Σ.Wrap
k
m
d
DBKE encryption
File
System
c
w
Symmetric
Decryption
Π.Dec
Keyless
Key Unwrap
Σ.Unwrap
c
w
k
m
DBKE decryption
Fig. 3: Architectural diagram for generic construction of a difficulty-based keyless
encryption scheme Γ = Γ [Π,Σ] from a difficulty-based keyless key wrap scheme
Σ and a symmetric encryption scheme Π .
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Γ.Enc(d,m):
1. (k,w)←$ Σ.Wrap(d)
2. c←$ Π.Enc(k,m)
3. return (c, w)
Γ.Dec((c, w)):
1. k′ ← Σ.Unwrap(w)
2. m′ ← Π.Dec(k′, c′)
3. return m′
Fig. 4: Generic construction of a difficulty-based keyless encryption scheme Γ =
Γ [Π,Σ] from a difficulty-based keyless key wrap scheme Σ and a symmetric
encryption scheme Π .
Definition 3 (Keyless key wrap scheme). A keyless key wrap scheme Σ
for a key space K = {0, 1}λ with maximum difficulty level D ∈ N consists of two
algorithms:
– Σ.Wrap(d) $→ (k, w): A (probabilistic) key wrapping algorithm that takes as
input difficulty level d ≤ D and outputs key k ∈ K and wrapped key w.
– Σ.Unwrap(w)→ k′: A deterministic key unwrapping algorithm that takes as
input wrapped key w and outputs key k ∈ K or an error ⊥ 6∈ K.
Correctness, again, is defined in the natural way: applying Unwrap to a
wrapped key w output by Wrap should yield, with certainty, the same key k
as originally output by Wrap.
The desirable security property for a keyless key wrap scheme will be in-
distinguishability of keys: given the wrapped key, can the adversary learn any-
thing about the key within it? The key indistinguishability security experiment
Expkey-indΣ,d for an adversary A trying to break key indistinguishability of a key-
less key wrap scheme at difficulty level d is shown in Figure 2. We define the
advantage of such an adversary in the security experiment as Advkey-indΣ,d (A) =∣∣∣2 · Pr [Expkey-indΣ,d (A)⇒ true
]
− 1
∣∣∣. As with DBKE security, useful forms ofAdvkey-indΣ,d (A)
will relate the amount of work done by the adversary, the difficulty level, and
the adversary’s success probability.
As noted above, we generically construct a difficulty-based keyless encryption
scheme by combining a traditional symmetric encryption scheme with a keyless
key wrap scheme, as outlined in Figure 3. Let Π be a symmetric encryption
scheme with key space K = {0, 1}λ, and let Σ be a keyless key wrap scheme
for key space K with maximum difficulty level D. Construct the difficulty-based
keyless encryption scheme Γ [Π,Σ] from Π and Σ as outlined in Figure 3 and
specified in Figure 4.
Our DBKE scheme Γ is secure, in the sense of Figure 2, under the assumption
that the building blocks are secure. The proof follows from a straightforward
game-hopping argument; details are presented in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 1. If Σ is a key-indistinguishable difficulty-based keyless key wrap
scheme, and Π is a one-time indistinguishable symmetric encryption scheme,
then Γ = Γ [Π,Σ] is a secure difficulty-based keyless encryption scheme. More
precisely, let d ≤ D and let A be a probabilistic algorithm. Then there exists
algorithms B1 and B2, such that Adv
db-ind
Γ,d (A) ≤ 2 ·Adv
key-ind
Σ,d (B
A
1
)+AdvindΠ (B
A
2
).
Moreover, BA
1
and BA
2
have about the same runtime as A.
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3.2 Hash-based construction of difficulty-based keyless key wrap
We now show how to construct our difficulty-based keyless key wrap using a
hash-based puzzle. The idea is simple: a random seed r is chosen, and the key
and a checksum of the seed are derived from the seed using hash functions. The
wrapped key consists of the checksum of the seed and the seed with some of
its bits removed ; the number of bits removed corresponds to the difficulty of the
puzzle. This is similar to the sub-puzzle construction of Juels and Brainard [12]
or partial inversion proof of work by Jakobsson and Juels [11]. Such a puzzle is
solved by trying all possibilities for the missing bits, in any order and with or
without using parallelization.
In particular, let λ ∈ N, and let H1, H2 : {0, 1}
λ → {0, 1}λ be independent
hash functions. Define keyless key wrap scheme P = P [H1, H2] as in Figure 5
(left). The notation r[λ− d : λ] on line 2 of P.Wrap denotes taking the substring
of r corresponding to indices λ− d up to λ, removing the first d bits of r.
The following theorem shows the key indistinguishability security of our hash-
based keyless key wrap scheme P in the random oracle model. The proof consists
of a query counting argument in the random oracle model; details are presented
in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 2. Let H1 and H2 be random oracles. Let λ ∈ N and let d ≤ λ.
Let P = P [H1, H2] be the keyless key wrap scheme from Figure 5 (left). Let A
be an adversary in key indistinguishability experiment against P which makes
q1 and q2 distinct queries to its H1 and H2 random oracles, respectively. Then
Advkey-indP,d (A) ≤
q1
2d−1
+ 2
2d−q1
.
Puzzle granularity. The partial pre-image puzzle construction used in Figure 5
does not allow for fine-grained control of difficulty: removing each additional bit
increases the expected computational cost by a factor of 2. Higher granularity
can be achieved similar to how the puzzle difficulty in Bitcoin is set, by giving a
hint that narrows the range of data from 2d to some smaller subset.
P.Wrap(d):
1. r←$ {0, 1}λ
2. r ← r[λ− d : λ]
3. h← H1(r)
4. k ← H2(r)
5. w ← (h, r)
6. return (k,w)
P.Unwrap(w = (h, r)):
1. d← λ− |r|
2. for i ∈ {0, 1}d:
3. r′ ← i‖r
4. h′ ← H1(r
′)
5. if h′ = h:
6. k ← H2(r
′)
7. return k
8. return ⊥
Γ [Π,P ].Degrade(cˆ, d′):
1. parse cˆ as (c, w = (h, r))
2. d← λ− |r|
3. abort if d′ < d
4. r′ ← r[d′ − d : |r|]
5. w′ ← (h, r′)
6. return (c, w′)
Fig. 5: Left: Construction of a hash-based keyless key wrap scheme P =
P [H1, H2] from hash functions H1, H2. Right: Degradation algorithm for DBKE
Γ = Γ [Π,P ] constructed using generic construction Γ of Figure 4 using hash-
based keyless key wrap scheme P of left.
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3.3 Puzzle Degradation
We now introduce an additional feature of difficulty-based keyless encryption
that emerges naturally from our hash-based keyless key wrap construction: puz-
zle degradation. Abstractly, puzzle degradation is a process that takes a DBKE
ciphertext and increases the difficulty of decrypting it, preferably without need-
ing to decrypt and then re-encrypt at a higher difficulty level.
In the context of the ArchiveSafe long-term archiving system, this may be
used to gradually increase the difficulty of files that have not been accessed for a
certain period of time. For example, a monthly maintenance process could apply
degradation to stored files to gradually increase the cost (to both an attacker
and an honest party) of accessing increasingly older files.
The DBKE system ∆ from Definition 1 is augmented with the algorithm:
– ∆.Degrade(c, d′) $→ c′: A (possibly probabilistic) algorithm that takes as
input ciphertext c and target difficulty level d′ ≤ D, and outputs updated
ciphertext c′.
Correctness is extended to demand that a ciphertext output by ∆.Enc then
degraded any number of times is still correctly decrypted by ∆.Dec (although
decryption may take longer).
Security with the degraded algorithm included should mean, intuitively, that
a ciphertext degraded any number of times can be decrypted only using the
required amount of work at the new difficulty level.
We capture both correctness and security of degradation formally by de-
manding that, for all d ≤ d′ ≤ D and all m ∈ M, we have that ∆.Enc(d′,m) ≡
∆.Degrade(d′, ∆.Enc(d,m)); in other words: the distribution of ciphertexts pro-
duced by encrypting at difficulty d′ is identical to the distribution of ciphertexts
produced by encrypting at difficulty d and then degrading to difficulty d′.
We can achieve degradation in DBKE Γ = Γ [Π,P ] constructed from our
hash-based keyless key wrap P in a trivial way: by removing (d′ − d) more bits
from the puzzle hint r. This clearly requires no decryption and re-encryption,
only a constant-time edit to the metadata stored containing the wrapped key.
The procedure Γ.Degrade is stated in Figure 5 (right). Degraded ciphertexts are
identically distributed to ciphertexts freshly generated at the target difficulty
level, as removing additional bits of the partial seed r is associative. An adversary
who possess a copy of the metadata from an earlier version of the archive prior to
degradation can solve puzzles and decrypt at the earlier, non-degraded difficulty
level.
3.4 Additional Considerations
Outsourcing Puzzle Solving. The generic DBKE construction Γ of Figure 4 allows
the key unwrapping and ciphertext decryption to be done separately, so the
expensive key unwrapping could be outsourced to a cloud server. In the example
of the hash-based keyless key wrap scheme P of Figure 5, the user could give the
wrapped key w = (h, r) to the cloud server who unwraps and returns the key k,
which the user then locally uses to decrypt the ciphertext c.
ArchiveSafe: Mass-Leakage-Resistant Storage from Proof-of-Work 13
This does mean that the cloud server learns the encryption key k. However,
this can be avoided with the following adaption to the construction P of Figure 5.
During wrapping, the algorithm generates an additional salt value s←$ {0, 1}λ
and computes k ← H2(r‖s); s is stored in the wrapped key w. When outsourcing
the unwrapping to the cloud server, the user only sends h and r, but not s. The
cloud server is still able to use the checksum h with the partial seed r to recover
the full seed r, but lacks the salt s and thus the cloud server alone cannot
compute the decryption key k. Theorem 2 still applies to this adaptation.
Combining Keyless and Keyed Encryption. As previously mentioned, our key-
less encryption approach can (and should) be used in conjunction with tradi-
tional keyed encryption mechanisms using a different set of keys. Traditional
keyed encryption gives honest parties a (conjecturally exponential) work factor
advantage over adversaries if keys remain uncompromised, while keyless encryp-
tion slows adversaries if the traditional encryption keys are compromised. The
two schemes can be layered in one of two ways: first applying keyless encryp-
tion DBKE and encrypting the result using keyed symmetric encryption Sym
(i.e., c ← Sym.Enc(k,DBKE.Enc(d,m))) or in the order order, with keyless en-
cryption on the outer layer (i.e., c ← DBKE.Enc(d, Sym.Enc(k,m))). Either
approach yields robust confidentiality, but we recommend the latter method as
it facilitates the puzzle degradation process described in Section 3.3.
4 Evaluation
We evaluate ArchiveSafe by measuring its performance against other systems
through real life experiment. The goals of the experiment are to: (1) measure
the overhead ArchiveSafe introduces on adversaries and honest users, and (2)
verify that puzzle solving difficulty scale according to the theoretical system
design.
4.1 Prototype Implementation
To run the evaluation experiment, we implemented a prototype of ArchiveSafe.
In terms of instantiating the difficulty-based keyless encryption using the generic
construction from Section 3.1, our proof-of-concept uses AES-128 in CBC mode
for the symmetric encryption scheme. The hash functions H1 and H2 in the
hash-based keyless key wrap scheme are both instantiated with Argon2id [5]
with a prefix byte acting as a domain separator between H1 and H2, with the
following parameters: parallelism level: 8; memory: 102,400KiB; iterations: 2;
output length: 128 bits. We did not parallelize puzzle solving in Unwrap to
avoid locking other system operations, but it is easily parallelized.
The ArchiveSafe prototype is implemented as a Linux Filesystem in Userspace
(FUSE) using a Python toolkit8 to simplify implementation. Our Python FUSE
driver relies on the OpenSSL library for encryption and decryption, and Ubuntu’s
8 https://github.com/skorokithakis/python-fuse-sample
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argon2 package. In a real deployment in the context of a filesystem, ArchiveSafe
would be implemented as a kernel module, likely written in C, for improved
performance and reliability.
Our prototype has a tuneable difficulty level, which we label in this section
as D1, D2, D3, etc. Difficulty Dx corresponds to hash-based keyless key wrap
scheme P of Figure 5 with difficulty parameter d = 4x; in other words, D1
removes 4 bits of the seed, D2 removes 8 bits of the seed, etc. We chose a 4-bit
step between difficulty levels to focus on how system behaviour scales across
difficulty levels; finer gradations could be chosen by users.
4.2 Experimental Setup
The experiment measures ArchiveSafe’s performance at three difficulty levels
(D1, D2, D3) compared to an unencrypted file system (denoted UN) and Linux’s
built-in folder encryption using eCryptfs9 (denoted FE) and disk encryption
(denoted DE) on read and write tasks at different file sizes. When running the
ArchiveSafe experiments, the ArchiveSafe FUSE driver was writing its files to
an unencrypted file system.
Measurements. For each storage system being evaluated, we measure read
and write times for files of sizes 1KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, and 100MB. Per-
formance is measured at the application level, from the time the file is opened
until the time the read/write operation is completed. For folder and disk en-
cryption, this includes the filesystem’s encryption operations. For ArchiveSafe,
we instrumented the driver to record the total time as well times for different
sub-tasks (encryption, puzzle solving, decryption, file system I/O).
Test environment. Measurements were performed on a single-user Linux ma-
chine with no other processes running. The computer was a MacBook Pro run-
ning Ubuntu Linux 18.04 LTS with an 4-core Intel Core i7-4770HQ processor
with base frequency 2.2GHz, bursting to 3.4GHz. The computer had 16GiB of
RAM. The hard drive was a 256GiB solid state drive with 512-byte logical sec-
tors and 4096-byte physical sectors. The disk encryption was done using Linux
Unified Key Setup system version 2.0, and folder encryption was done using the
Enterprise Cryptographic Filesystem (eCryptfs) version 5.3.
Execution. For each storage system and file size, we performed many repeti-
tions of the following tasks. A file was created with randomly generated alphanu-
meric characters using a non-cryptographic random number generator. Read and
write operations were measured as indicated above. For file sizes of 1KB, 100KB,
1MB, and 10MB, we collected data for 1000 writes and reads; for 100MB files,
we ran 200 writes and reads, due to extensive time of operations at this size.
4.3 Results
Table 1 shows average read and write times for the file systems under consid-
eration at different file sizes. Since read operations in the ArchiveSafe system
9 https://www.ecryptfs.org/
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File system
Read Write
1KB 100KB 1MB 10MB 100MB 1KB 100KB 1MB 10MB 100MB
Unencrypted (UN) 0.526 0.550 1.70 10.1 110 0.07 0.25 0.85 6.76 97.82
Disk Encryption (DE) 0.737 0.924 3.15 10.5 160 0.08 0.25 0.83 6.63 97.97
Folder Encryption (FE) 0.737 0.961 3.42 10.9 190 0.12 0.50 3.31 29.07 319.88
ArchiveSafe D1 630 630 630 650 860 141.05 141.67 146.09 221.73 848.30
ArchiveSafe D2 7070 7080 7310 7180 7290 141.25 141.43 145.08 223.50 847.02
ArchiveSafe D3 112140 111760 107390 114530 107630 141.01 140.98 145.74 222.40 846.06
Table 1: Average read and write times in milliseconds
Diff. 1KB 100KB 1MB 10MB 100MB
D1 Puzzle Solve 510 510 510 510 500
Decryption 5.42 5.71 7.25 20 150
Other 0.387 0.373 0.378 0.384 0.363
D2 Puzzle Solve 6960 6980 7210 7050 6930
Decryption 5.58 6.12 7.89 20 140
Other 0.357 0.373 0.376 0.374 0.335
D3 Puzzle Solve 112040 111730 107280 114410 107270
Decryption 5.56 5.94 7.96 20 140
Other 1.075 1.216 0.971 1.195 1.045
Table 2: Read sub-tasks average times in mil-
liseconds
D1 D2 D3
103
104
105
T
im
e
in
m
s
Fig. 6: Puzzle solving time
in milliseconds (average, stan-
dard deviation)
become increasingly expensive with difficulty, we show in Table 2 the average
time of sub-tasks of ArchiveSafe read operations at different file sizes and diffi-
culties: the puzzle solving time (which should scale with puzzle difficulty), the
system file read time plus decryption time (which should scale with file size),
and the overhead from other file system driver operations (which includes puz-
zle read and system file open times). As the partial pre-image puzzle used in
ArchiveSafe leads to highly variable solving times, Figure 6 shows the average
time and standard deviation for puzzle solving at difficulties D1, D2, and D3.
4.4 Discussion
The results show consistent behaviour across different file sizes. The larger files
consumed more time in decrypting and reading. We also observed that the time
consumed is roughly the same for smaller file sizes (1KB and 100KB) where
operation cost is dominated by overhead.
As expected, the read speeds decrease with the difficulty level because the
system must solve the puzzle before reading the file and the puzzle solving effort
scales with the difficulty level. As per Table 2, puzzle solve times on average
scale by a factor of 13.6–14.1× between D1 and D2 and a factor of 14.9–16.2×
between D2 and D3, roughly in line with the theoretical scaling factor of 16×.
Evaluating the overhead added by ArchiveSafe for write operations, we see
in Table 1 that ArchiveSafe incurs a baseline overhead related to setting up
the puzzle (which involves 2 Argon2 calls), then scales with the file size due to
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D3 D4 D5 D6
Honest user decrypting 1 file
Local machine, threaded 4 cores, 2.2GHz 0.5min. 7.3min. 2 hrs. 31 hrs.
Cloud server c5.metal, spot pricing ≪$0.01 <$0.01 $0.05 $0.73
Adversary decrypting 1 million files
Cloud server c5.metal 8 days 130 days 5.7 yrs. 91.4 yrs.
Cloud server c5.metal, spot pricing $178 $2,852 $45,648 $730,364
Table 3: Dollar cost and computation time required to unlock ArchiveSafe files
the cost of AES encryption and writing. Note that ArchiveSafe uses a different
encryption library (user-space calls to OpenSSL) compared with disk and file en-
cryption (kernel encryption via dm-crypt), so symmetric encryption/decryption
performance is not directly comparable, but we see similar scaling.
The short summary of performance is that ArchiveSafe adds a 140–520ms
overhead when writing a file, and a customizable overhead when reading a file,
ranging from 510ms at difficulty D1, 7 seconds at D2, or 110 seconds at D3.
But recall that adding computational overhead at read time is exactly the pur-
pose of ArchiveSafe! What an acceptable difficulty level—and hence acceptable
computational overhead at read time for honest users—is a policy choice by the
system administrator. As noted earlier, choosing the difficulty level depends on
the tolerable cost for honest users to access data, the perceived risk of a data
breach, and the anticipated value of the information to an adversary, and is a cal-
culation that must be left to the adopter. Note that honest users need not solely
rely on sequential operations on their own computer: as described in Section 3.4
an ArchiveSafe installation could be configured so that honest users offload their
puzzle solving tasks to private or commercial clouds which are spun up on de-
mand with large amounts of parallelization to reduce the wall clock time before
they can access a file.
Table 3 shows examples of costs at higher difficulty levels. To provide further
interpretation to these costs, we look not only at the computation time required
for an honest user on our test platform to decrypt a file, but also at the real-world
cost for an adversary, based on the cost of renting computation time on Amazon
Web Services (AWS) Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2) platform. EC2 has many
machine types available; Argon2 is designed to not be substantially accelerated
by more sophisticated architectures, GPUs, or ASICs. As such we choose for our
pricing example an EC2 instance that minimizes cost per core-GHz-hour; the
c5.metal EC2 instance type has 96 Intel Xeon cores running at 3.6GHz at a
cost of USD$0.9122 per hour using Amazon’s cheapest spot pricing model.10
We can see, for example, that at difficulty D5, an honest user can unlock an
archived file with about 2 hours of work on a local machine, or about 3 minutes of
c5.metal rental costing 4.5 cents at spot pricing (20 cents on-demand pricing).
10 https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/,
https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/spot/pricing/; prices as of April 23, 2020.
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However, an adversary trying to decrypt 1 million such files from a data breach
would need 5.7 years of c5.metal rental at a spot pricing cost of USD$45,648.
5 Conclusion
ArchiveSafe, using difficulty-based keyless encryption, can add defense-in-depth
to confidentiality of archived data and change the economics of mass leakage
attacks via data breaches. We expect that most uses of ArchiveSafe would be in
addition to, not as a replacement for, traditional keyed encryption; full crypto-
graphic security would be achieved if encryption keys are properly managed and
kept safe, but ArchiveSafe provides a residual level of protection if traditional
encryption keys are also breached. This means the key management service is
no longer a single point of failure.
One target application is IT systems which retain large amounts of archival
data, most of which will be rarely or perhaps never again accessed by legitimate
users. Although honest users have no advantage in difficulty-based decryption
compared to an adversary on a file-by-file basis, if their operational goals are
different—an honest user decrypting 1 file occasionally, versus an adversary de-
crypting thousands or millions of files quickly—their costs are different.
Our approach can be applied in a variety of system architectures: local storage
and execution (as demonstrated by our prototype), local storage with private or
public cloud assistance for puzzle solving, or remote (file server / cloud) storage
with local or assisted puzzle solving. Our approach can also apply to different
storage paradigms, including file systems, cloud “blob” storage, and databases.
Puzzle difficulty can be set as a system-wide or with higher granularity based
individual records’ sensitivity. A novel features of our construction is the ability
to degrade puzzle difficulty effectively for free, which could be built into periodic
maintenance or through a heuristic system based on suspicious activity.
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Game G0:
1. (m0,m1, st)←$A(1
d)
2. b←$ {0, 1}
3. (k,w)←$ Σ.Wrap(d)
4. c←$ Π.Enc(k,mb)
5. b′←$A((c, w), st)
6. return (b′ = b)
Game G1:
1. (m0,m1, st)←$A(1
d)
2. b←$ {0, 1}
3. (k,w)←$ Σ.Wrap(d)
4. k′ ←$K
5. c←$ Π.Enc( k′ ,mb)
6. b′ ←$A((c, w), st)
7. return (b′ = b)
Fig. 7: Sequence of games for proof of Theorem 1. Changes between games are
highlighted .
A Proofs
A.1 Security of Generic DBKE Construction Γ
Proof (of Theorem 1). The security proof proceeds as a sequence of games. For
Game Gi, let Si denote the event that game Gi outputs true. Ley K be the key
space of the symmetric encryption scheme Π , which is also the key space of the
keyless key wrap scheme Σ.
Game 0. Denoted G0, Game 0 as shown in the left side of Figure 7 is the db-ind
experiment from Figure 2 with construction Γ = Γ [Π,Σ] inline. Thus,
Pr
[
Expdb-indΓ,d (A)⇒ true
]
= Pr[S0] . (1)
Game 1. In this game, the challenger generates two symmetric encryption keys k
and k′; it uses k in the key wrapping scheme, but k′ in the symmetric encryption
scheme. This is shown in Game G1 in the right side of Figure 7.
First we show in Appendix A.1 that Game 0 and Game 1 are indistinguish-
able under the assumption that the key wrapping scheme is secure. Then we
argue in Appendix A.1 that breaking Game 1 corresponds to breaking the indis-
tinguishability of the symmetric key encryption scheme.
Claim. Let B1 be the algorithm shown in Figure 8, which is an adversary against
the key indistinguishability of keyless key wrap scheme Σ. Then
|Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]| ≤ Adv
key-ind
Σ,d (B
A
1
) . (2)
Proof. B1’s input is a challenge (w, k0, k1) from a challenger for the key indistin-
guishability of difficulty-based keyless key wrap scheme Σ. This means that w
is the wrapping of either k0 or k1, chosen by a random hidden bit b in Exp
key-ind
Σ,d .
When the hidden bit b = 0, and hence when w is the wrapping of k0, then, in
the ciphertext (c, w) that B1 gives to A, the key used in the key wrapping is
the same as the key used in the symmetric encryption scheme, so B1 exactly
simulates Game 0 to A. When the hidden bit b = 1, and hence when w is the
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BA1 (w, k0, k1):
1. (m0, m1, st)←$A(1
d)
2. bˆ←$ {0, 1}
3. c←$ Π.Enc(k0,mbˆ)
4. bˆ′ ←$A((c, w), st)
5. if (bˆ′ = bˆ) return 0
6. else return 1
BA2 ():
1. (m0, m1, st)←$A(1
d)
2. return (m0, m1, st)
BA2 (c, st):
1. (kˆ, w)←$ Σ.Wrap(d)
2. bˆ′ ←$A((c, w), st)
3. return bˆ′
Fig. 8: Reductions for the proof of Theorem 1.
wrapping of k1, then, in the ciphertext (c, w) that B1 gives to A, the key used
in the key wrapping is different from the key used in the symmetric encryption
scheme, so B1 exactly simulates Game 1 to A. Thus, if A outputs bˆ
′ with different
probabilities in Game 0 compared to Game 1, then BA
1
outputs bˆ′ with different
probabilities when the hidden bit b is 0 or 1. This shows that eq. (2) holds. ⊓⊔
Claim. Let B2 be the algorithm shown in Figure 8, which is an adversary against
the one-time indistinguishability of symmetric encryption scheme Π . Then
Pr[S1] ≤ Pr
[
ExpindΠ (B
A
2
)⇒ true
]
. (3)
Proof. BA
2
is an adversary in the security experiment ExpindΠ (B
A
2
) for the one-
time indistinguishability of symmetric encryption scheme Π . When we inline the
code of BA
2
in ExpindΠ (B
A
2
), we see that it is exactly the same code as Game 1,
except some lines are reordered, and some variables are named differently. In
particular, A is run with a ciphertext c that is the encryption of either m0 or
m1 under the key k from the symmetric encryption experiment, but this key is
different from the key kˆ that is in the wrapped key w that A is provided with.
Thus, eq. (3) holds. ⊓⊔
Combining equations (1), (2), and (3), we get
Advdb-indΓ,d (A) =
∣∣∣2 · Pr [Expdb-indΓ,d (A)⇒ true
]
− 1
∣∣∣
= |2 · Pr[S0]− 1| (by (1))
= |2 · (Pr[S0]− Pr[S1] + Pr[S1])− 1|
≤ 2 |Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]|+ |2 · Pr[S1]− 1|
≤ 2Advkey-indΣ,d (B
A
1
) + |2 · Pr[S1]− 1| (by (2))
≤ 2Advkey-indΣ,d (B
A
1
) +
∣∣∣2 · Pr[ExpindΠ (BA2 )⇒ true]− 1
∣∣∣ (by (3))
= 2 · Advkey-indΣ,d (B
A
1
) + AdvindΠ (B
A
2
)
which is the desired result.
By inspection of BA
1
and BA
2
, we can see that their runtimes are the runtime
of A plus a minimal cost of either encryption or wrapping. ⊓⊔
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A.2 Security of Hash-Based Keyless Key Wrap Scheme P
Proof (of Theorem 2). Let k0, k1, and w be as in Exp
key-ind
P,d in Figure 2 for keyless
key wrap scheme P , so that r is the seed behind k0 and w.
Let W be the event that Expkey-indP,d (A) outputs true. Let Ei be the event
that A queries r to random oracle Hi, for i = 1, 2. Our task is to bound Pr[W ],
which we do using the following application of the law of total probability:
Pr[W ] =Pr[W |¬E2] · Pr[¬E2]
+ Pr[W |E2 ∧ E1] · Pr[E2 ∧E1] + Pr[W |E2 ∧ ¬E1] · Pr[E2 ∧ ¬E1]
If E2 does not occur, then, since k0 = H2(r), A has no information about k0
and thus has no advantage in distinguishing k0 from k1, so Pr[W |¬E2] =
1
2
.
Next, we observe that Pr[E2 ∧ E1] ≤ Pr[E1]. The only way A can learn
information about r (and hence k) is by querying values to H1, and since H1 is
a random oracle, the adversary can rule out at most one guess for the missing d
bits of r with each query to H1. Thus Pr[E1] ≤
q1
2d
.
Now we observe that Pr[E2 ∧ ¬E1] = Pr[E2|¬E1] Pr[¬E1] ≤ Pr[E2|¬E1].
Since the q1 queries to H1 could have ruled out q1 candidate values for the
missing bits of r, we have that Pr[E2|¬E1] ≤
q2
2d−q1
. Additionally, we note that,
when E2 ∧ ¬E1 occurs, A has no information to help it determine which of its
q2 queries to H2 caused E2 to occur, so Pr[W |E2 ∧ ¬E1] =
1
q2
.
Substituting the above observations into the expression for Pr[W ], and bound-
ing all other probabilities by 1, we get
Pr[W ] ≤
(
1
2
· 1
)
+
(
1 ·
q1
2d
)
+
(
1
q2
·
q2
2d − q1
)
=
1
2
+
q1
2d
+
1
2d − q1
;
substituting into the advantage expression yields the desired result. ⊓⊔
